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INTRODUCTION
This appeal is from a contempt proceeding arising out of a divorce
action. The district court adjudged Respondent Ron Rosser [“Ron”] in
contempt of court for fraudulently inducing Petitioner Holly Rosser
[“Holly”] to stipulate to a provision in their Decree of Divorce, which
resulted in Holly being solely responsible for the parties’ tax obligation of
over $22,000. This was despite the parties agreeing at mediation that
they would divide the tax obligation equally.
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s judgment, holding
that because Ron’s misrepresentations were directed at Holly rather than
the district court itself, they did not constitute contemptible “deceit”
under Utah Code § 78B-6-301(4). However, this interpretation is not
supported by either the plain text of the statute or by its context or
purpose. Rather, these factors, as well as the case law of other
jurisdictions and scholarly authority, support an interpretation that
focuses not on who the deceit is communicated to, but rather whether the
deceit interfered with the administration of justice, which Ron’s deceit
clearly did.
Moreover, The Court of Appeals reached this issue despite the fact
that Ron did not raise the issue of whether his acts qualified as
contemptible deceit before the district court or in his opening brief before
the Court of Appeals. As such, the issue was improperly reached and is
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reversible error. The Court should reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and remand for further proceedings.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
In its Order of June 24, 2019,1 this Court granted certiorari as to
the following issues:
Issue One: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its construction
and application of Subsection 78B-6-301(4) of the Utah Code.2
Background and Preservation. The district court found Ron in contempt
“due to his deliberate deceit” by “knowingly and intentionally [misleading
Holly] about his failure to pay the taxes he agreed to pay on June 16,
2016.”3 The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, holding
that the term “deceit” in Utah Code § 78B-6-301(4) [“Subsection (4)”] is
limited to actions taken toward the court itself, and not toward another
party.4 Holly timely objected to the Court of Appeals’ decision on this
issue by raising it in her Petition for Writ of Certiorari,5 thereby
preserving the issue.

1.

A copy of this order is included in the addendum—see infra at 55.

2.
As this statute is of central importance to this appeal, it is
reproduced in its entirety in the addendum. See infra at 35.
3.
Infra at 52–53 (Dist. Ct. Ruling, Findings ¶ 16 & Conclusions ¶ 2) (R.
at 1134–35).
4.

Infra at 42–43 (Op. at ¶ 14).

5.

Pet. Cert. at 1, 12–18 (filed Apr. 17, 2019).
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Standard of Review. This Court reviews the legal conclusions of the Court
of Appeals for correctness.6
Issue Two: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in addressing the
issue of the proper interpretation of Subsection 78B-6-301(4) of the Utah
Code in light of the briefing on appeal.
Background and Preservation. The Court of Appeals reversed the District
Court’s decision on the basis that Ron’s acts did not fall within the scope
of contemptible deceit under Subsection (4) as a matter of law. However,
this issue was neither preserved in the district court, nor was it raised in
Ron’s opening brief on appeal. Moreover, the Court of Appeals did not give
the parties notice that it would consider the issue sua sponte, did not
order supplemental briefing on the issue, and did not analyze whether the
issue was properly considered under an exception to the general rule of
waiver in its opinion. As Holly had no notice of the Court of Appeals’
action before its opinion was issued, she timely objected by raising it in
her Petition for Writ of Certiorari,7 thereby preserving the issue.
Standard of Review. This Court reviews the Court of Appeals’ application
of the rules regarding preservation and waiver for correctness.8

6.

Harris v. ShopKo Stores, Inc., 2013 UT 34, ¶ 16, 308 P.3d 449.

7.

Pet. Cert. at 1, 18–20.

8.

State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 6, 416 P.3d 443.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is a contempt proceeding arising out of a divorce action.
After the divorce decree was entered on August 8, 2016,9 Holly filed a
motion for order to show cause on November 11, 2016, alleging that Ron
had fraudulently induced her to stipulate to a term in the decree that was
inconsistent with the parties’ settlement agreement, and seeking her
damages caused by Ron’s deceit as well as her costs and attorney fees.10
On January 3, 2017, Ron filed a cross-motion for order to show cause,
alleging that he was entitled under the decree to certain rebate checks
received by Holly and that she had failed to deliver them to him.11
The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the matters
raised in these motions on August 17, 2017.12 On August 28, 2017, the
district court issued a written ruling finding Ron in contempt “due to his
deliberate deceit,” finding that Holly was not in contempt, and awarding
judgment for Holly.13 On September 6, 2017, the district court entered a

9.

R. at 481–499.

10.

R. at 500–505.

11.

R. at 528–530.

12. R. at 1129 (minutes of hearing); 1267–1404 (transcript of evidentiary
hearing).
13.

Infra at 49–54 (R. at 1131–1136).
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supplemental judgment for Holly’s costs and attorney fees.14 Ron
appealed these judgments on September 1 and 22, 2017.15
After receiving the parties’ briefs and hearing oral argument, on
January 10, 2019, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion reversing the
district court’s order on grounds that the acts that the district court found
that Ron committed did not constitute “deceit, or abuse of the process or
proceedings of the court”16 or “disobedience of a lawful judgment, order or
process of the court” under Utah Code § 78B-6-301(4)–(5).17 On February
14, 2019, the Court of Appeals amended the opinion to clarify an ancillary
issue.18 Holly petitioned this Court for certiorari review on April 17, 2019,
which this Court granted in an order dated June 24, 2019.19

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following are the facts material to the issue presented, recited
“from the record in the light most favorable to the findings of the trial
court” as required by the procedures of this Court.20
After twenty-five years of marriage, Holly and Ron separated in
2014, and Holly later petitioned for divorce.21 After filing cross-petitions
14.

Infra at 55 (R. at 1210).

15.

R. at 1152, 1229.

16.

Infra at 42–44 (Op. at ¶¶ 13–16).

17.

Infra at 44–46 (Op. at ¶¶ 17–20).

18.

Infra at 48 (Op. at ¶ 21 n.9).

19.

Infra at 55.

20.

See State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1990).
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for divorce in the district court,22 the parties attended mediation and
executed a settlement agreement on June 16, 2016.23 Paragraph 15 of
that settlement agreement provided that the parties would split their
2015 debt to the IRS agreement equally.24 At that time, the parties owed
$29,901.71 to the IRS for their business and personal taxes for 2015.25
Holly paid her half of the 2015 IRS debt shortly after mediation.26
Ron’s counsel then prepared proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law and a proposed decree of divorce.27 However, instead of
providing that the parties were to split their 2015 IRS debt equally, the
proposed decree provided that Holly “shall pay all fees charged by” the tax
preparer, and she “shall be solely entitled to receive any refund resulting
from the amended returns, and shall also be responsible to pay any tax
liabilities resulting to any of the parties for the year 2015.”28 This was
because after mediation, the parties decided to file an amended return for
2015, which would result in a $7,900.00 refund, provided that each party
21.

Infra at 37 (Op. at ¶ 2).

22.

R. at 1–7, 15–30.

23. Infra at 50 (Dist. Ct. Ruling, Findings ¶ 1) (R. at 1132); R. at 398–
400 (settlement agreement).
24. Infra at 50 (Dist. Ct. Ruling, Findings ¶ 4) (R. at 1132); R. at 399
(“IRS debt from 2015, 50% Ron and 50% Holly.”).
25. Infra at 50 (Dist. Ct. Ruling, Findings ¶ 5) (R. at 1132); R. at 569 (tax
bill from IRS dated June 6, 2016).
26.

Infra at 50 (Dist. Ct. Ruling, Findings ¶ 7) (R. at 1132).

27.

R. at 427–461.

28.

R. at 453–454 (Paragraph 9.r).
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had paid his or her half of the IRS debt.29 Holly agreed to pay the tax
preparer’s fee in exchange for receiving the entirety of the refund.30 Thus,
Holly’s counsel approved the proposed findings and decree, including the
changed provision for the 2015 tax debt,31 and the district court signed
and entered the findings and decree on August 8, 2016.32 The parties then
signed and filed the amended tax return on August 22, 2016.33 However,
Holly later found out that despite what he had led her to believe, Ron had
not paid his half of the 2015 IRS debt.34 Instead of receiving a $7,900.00
refund, Holly had to pay an additional $7,194.98.35

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN DISTRICT COURT
After receiving this tax bill, Holly filed a motion for order to show
cause on November 11, 2016,36 alleging as follows:
In the foregoing circumstances, [Ron] has defrauded [Holly]. [Ron]
knowingly made a material misrepresentation as to a presently
existing fact. To wit: that he had theretofore paid his $14,951.11
29.

Infra at 50 (Dist. Ct. Ruling, Findings ¶ 8) (R. at 1132).

30. R. at 885 (July 29, 2016 email from Ron’s counsel stating, “if Holly is
willing to pay the $914.59 (or whatever the exact amount of the Precise bill
will be for the amended return), then I think I can get Ron to agree to let
Holly keep the tax refunds”); R. at 1301 (Transcript, Hearing of Aug. 17,
2017, 35:7–19 (Testimony of Holly Rosser)).
31.

R. at 403–426.

32.

R. at 462–499.

33.

R. at 1017.

34.

Infra at 51–52 (Dist. Ct. Ruling, Findings ¶¶ 10–16) (R. at 1133–34).

35.

R. at 577 (tax bill from IRS dated Oct. 10, 2016).

36.

R. at 500–503.
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share of the 2015 tax bill. Such representation was material and
was made with malice for the purpose of inducing [Holly] to settle
on those terms. [Holly] reasonably relied upon the
misrepresentation to her detriment.37

Holly requested her damages caused by Ron’s deceit as well as her costs
and attorney fees.38 Despite the allegation of deceit and fraud in Holly’s
Motion for Order to Show Cause, Ron did not argue at any time before the
district court that Holly’s allegation of fraud did not constitute
contemptible deceit under Subsection (4), either at a hearing transcribed
and included in the record39 or in any written submission.40
Additionally, on December 1, 2016, Holly received rebate checks
from IPC that belonged to Ron under the Decree.41 Holly retained
possession of these checks to secure payment for the amounts she believed
she was owed for the 2015 taxes.42 On January 3, 2017, Ron filed a crossmotion for order to show cause, alleging that he was entitled under the

37.

R. at 502.

38.

R. at 502–503.

39. The transcripts for hearings held between Holly’s Motion for Order
to Show Cause and Ron’s Amended Notice of Appeal are located at R. at
809–846, 1257–1422.
40. Ron’s written submissions to the Court filed between Holly’s Motion
for Order to Show Cause and Ron’s Amended Notice of Appeal are located at
R. at 517–22, 538–46, 548–50, 620–51, 682–702, 733–798, 911–1025, 1053–
1109, 1115–28, 1152–86, 1195–1201, 1217–21, and 1224–30.
41.

R. at 600–603.

42.

R. at 583.
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decree to certain rebate checks received by Holly and that she had failed
to deliver them to him.43
After some procedural wrangling,44 the district court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on the matters raised in the parties’ respective
motions for order to show cause on August 17, 2017.45 On August 28,
2017, the district court issued a written ruling, finding in relevant part:
5.

The parties had received an IRS notice dated June 6, 2016, which
notified them that they owed $29,902.21 for unpaid 2015 taxes.

6.

The parties agreed [in Paragraph 15 of the June 16, 2016
mediation agreement] to each pay one half of that debt, or
$14,951.11.

7.

[Holly] paid her share of $14,951.11 within days of reaching the
settlement agreement.

8.

The parties intended on June 16, 2016 to file an Amended 2015 tax
return, which would result in [Holly] receiving a $7,900.00 tax
refund, which would only happen if they each paid their share of
the [] $29,902.21 in taxes.

43.

R. at 528–530.

44. The district court initially ruled in Holly’s favor on the grounds that
the undisputed material facts established his contempt (R. at 604, 705–719).
In an attempt to vacate this ruling and present evidence at an evidentiary
hearing, Ron filed a motion for reconsideration (R. at 623–640), a Rule 59
motion for new trial (R. at 733–746), and a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside (R.
at 747–758). In addition to opposing these motions, Holly filed a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment dismissing Ron’s motions (R. at 1029–1043).
These motions were disposed of in the district court’s order of July 25, 2017
setting aside its previous order of contempt and granting an evidentiary
hearing (R. at 1118–1119).
45. R. at 1129 (minutes of hearing); 1267–1404 (transcript of evidentiary
hearing).
Spencer Law Office PLLC
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9.

[Holly] assumed she would receive the $7,900.00 refund from the
Amended 2015 tax return, so she approved the amended tax
return.

10. At no point did [Ron] tell [Holly] that he had failed to pay his
$14,951.11 tax obligation.
11. Both [Holly] and [the parties’] accountant relied upon [Ron] having
paid his $14,951.11.
12. [Ron] knew he would eventually be found out, but chose to let his
deception go forward.
13. Consequently, [Holly] did not receive the agreed-upon $7,900.00
refund and she eventually had to pay an additional $7,174.98 in
taxes to the IRS.
14. [Holly] had to pay the additional $7,174.98 because on August 4,
2016, the parties entered into a Stipulated Motion For Entry of
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Final Decree of
Divorce, which required [Holly] to pay any remaining tax liabilities
for 2015, which she assumed was zero.
15. At the time this Stipulated Motion was filed, only [Ron] knew he
had failed to pay the obligation agreed to on June 16, 2016.
16. After listening to the parties at trial it was evident that [Ron]
knowingly and intentionally misled [Holly] about his failure to pay
the taxes he agreed to pay on June 16, 2016.46

Based on these findings, the district court concluded that Ron was
in contempt “due to his deliberate deceit and failure to act as agreed
between the parties” in the mediation agreement.47 The district court
further concluded that despite not paying the rebates as required by the
decree, Holly was not in contempt “due to her being victimized by [Ron’s]

46. Infra at 50–52 (Dist. Ct. Ruling, Findings ¶¶ 1, 5–16) (R. at 1132–
1134).
47.

Infra at 53 (Dist. Ct. Ruling, Conclusions ¶ 2) (R. at 1135).

Spencer Law Office PLLC
Petitioner’s Opening Brief

10

Aug. 28, 2019
No. 20190320-SC

deceit.”48 The district court then awarded judgment for $15,074.98 in
damages to Holly, plus her reasonable costs and attorney fees (which the
Court found she was entitled to because they “would not have been
incurred if [Ron] had not been deceitful”),49 and less the amount of the
rebates owing to Ron.50 On September 6, 2017, the district court entered a
supplemental judgment for Holly’s costs and attorney fees in the amount
of $17,870.00.51

PROCEEDINGS IN AND DISPOSITION BY COURT OF APPEALS
On appeal before the Court of Appeals, Ron did not raise the issue
of whether the facts found by the district court constituted contemptible
deceit under Subsection (4).52 Instead, in the portion of his opening brief
dealing with fraud and deceit, Ron appeared to assume that deceit toward
Holly is contemptible, and only addressed whether the evidence
supporting his deceit was sufficient for the district court to find fraud by
clear and convincing evidence.53 The first time Ron distinguished between

48. Infra at 52–53 (Dist. Ct. Ruling, Findings ¶¶ 20–23 & Conclusions
¶ 1) (R. at 1134–35).
49. Infra at 53 (Dist. Ct. Ruling, Findings ¶ 23 & Conclusions ¶ 4) (R. at
1135).
50.

Infra at 54 (Dist. Ct. Ruling, Judgment ¶¶ 1–3) (R. at 1136).

51.

Infra at 55 (R. at 1210).

52. Br. Appellant, 1–3 (Feb. 18, 2018) (outlining the issues raised on
appeal).
53.

Br. Appellant, 12–14 (Point II of Argument section).
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regular fraud and contemptible deceit was in his reply brief.54
Notwithstanding the fact that the issue was first raised in Ron’s reply
brief, and without giving notice or an opportunity for supplemental
briefing, the Court of Appeals considered and decided the issue of whether
Ron’s deceit toward Holly was contemptible deceit under Subsection (4).55
In interpreting this statute, the Court of Appeals did not rely on
any past Utah cases interpreting this statute or statutes with similar
language, nor did it rely upon case law from other jurisdictions or
authoritative scholarship on the issue. (As no supplemental briefing had
been ordered, Holly was not in a position to provide case law and other
authority at that time.) Rather, it concluded that since “the entire thrust
of the subsection is aimed at allowing a court to penalize deceitful misuse
of judicial proceedings by parties to those proceedings,” the term “deceit”
must be limited to actions taken toward the court itself, and not toward
another party.56 The Court of Appeals concluded that since “the deceit the
[district] court described in its findings” committed upon Holly rather
than upon the court, it was not contemptible deceit under the statute, and
the district court erred in holding Ron in contempt on those grounds.57

54.

Reply Br. Appellant, 9–11 (Point II.B. of Argument section).

55.

Infra at 42–44 (Op. at ¶¶ 13–16).

56.

Infra at 42–43 (Op. at ¶ 14).

57.

Infra at 42, 47 (Op. at ¶¶ 13 & 21).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This matter can be decided on one of two grounds—the Court can
either decide the question of the proper interpretation of Subsection (4) on
its merits, or it can reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision as improperly
reached, as the issue decided was never before it.
Point I of the Argument details how the Court of Appeals’
interpretation of Subsection (4) as only applying to deceit communicated
directly to a court is not supported by either the plain text of the statute
or by its context or purpose. Rather, these factors, as well as the case law
of other jurisdictions and scholarly authority, support an interpretation
that focuses not on who the deceit is communicated to, but rather whether
the deceit interfered with the administration of justice. This is similar to
a related principle in Utah law: the Fraud on the Court doctrine, which
distinguishes between ordinary fraud and fraud that defiles the court,
interferes with the administration of justice, or hinders a party from
presenting its claim or defense. Courts in several jurisdictions have noted
that fraud on the court is grounds for contempt, and this Court should
adopt this reasoning.
Point II of the Argument points out that the issue of the proper
interpretation of Subsection (4) was neither preserved in the lower court
or raised in Ron’s opening brief, and discusses the circumstances in which
an appellate court may rule on such an issue. There were no exceptions
that applied to allow the Court of Appeals to raise the issue sua sponte,
but even if there were, the procedural requirements for raising the issue
Spencer Law Office PLLC
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were not followed, making the Court of Appeals’ decision improper and
reversible error. For either of these reasons, the Court should reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to determine any properly
raised outstanding issues in the original appeal.

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION AND
HOLD THAT THE SCOPE OF CONTEMPTIBLE DECEIT UNDER SUBSECTION (4)
IS EQUIVALENT TO THAT OF THE DOCTRINE OF FRAUD ON THE COURT.
The first issue certified for review by this Court is the proper

construction and application of Subsection (4). Subsection (4) is part of
Utah Code § 78B-6-301, which lists a number of acts or omissions
constituting contempt, and provides, in relevant part:
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or its
proceedings are contempts of the authority of the court: . . .
(4) “deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by a
party to an action or special proceeding[.]

As explained supra in the Statement of the Case, the Court of
Appeals interpreted Subsection (4) to mean that a “deceit” is only
contemptible if it is directed toward the court itself, and not toward
another party or person. However, Holly believes that this interpretation
is in error. As the proper interpretation or Subsection (4) and the proper
scope of a district court’s power to hold a party in contempt for fraud or
deceit is a question of first impression for this Court,58 Holly will review
58.

See Pet. Cert. at 13–14.
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the language of the statute, its context and purpose, case law from other
jurisdictions, Utah cases interpreting statutes with similar language or
similar principles of law, and authoritative scholarship on the issue59 to
demonstrate that contemptible deceit under Subsection (4) includes fraud
directed toward the opposing party that prevents or hinders that party
from presenting its claim or defense.
A. The plain text of Subsection (4) does not support the Court of
Appeals’ interpretation.
In interpreting a statute, this Court begins by looking at its text.60
To be a contemptuous act or omission under Subsection (4), the act or
omission must fulfill three requirements: first, it must constitute “deceit”
or “abuse of the process or proceedings of the court,” second, it must be
“by a party to an action or special proceeding,” and third, it must be “in
respect to a court or its proceedings.” While the meaning of “party” is
obvious and uncontroversial (at least in the context of this case), the
analysis of Subsection (4) could benefit by defining the other terms in the
above requirements:

59. See Park v. Stanford, 2011 UT 41, ¶ 13, 258 P.3d 566 (“To assist in
our determination of an issue of first impression, we often look to guidance
from other jurisdictions as well as authoritative materials.”).
60. Otter Creek Reservoir v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 2009 UT 16,
¶ 14, 203 P.3d 1015.
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• “Deceit” is broadly understood to be synonymous with fraud or
willful misrepresentation.61
•

“Abuse of process” is the malicious use of legal process “primarily
to accomplish a purpose not within the scope of the proceeding for
which it was designed.”62

•

“In respect to” means concerning, regarding, related to or in
connection with.63

Moreover, the language of Subsection (4) does not include an object
that the deceit or abuse of process must be directed toward. Thus, contra
the Court of Appeals’ interpretation, the plain text of Subsection (4)
seems to provide that a party to an action or special proceeding who
makes a willful misrepresentation in connection with that proceeding is
in contempt of court, regardless of who that misrepresentation is directed
toward.

61. See Bennett v. Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9,
¶ 74, 70 P.3d 17 (defining the tort of deceit as equivalent to common-law
fraud); Van de Grift v. State, 2013 UT 11, ¶ 13, 299 P.3d 1043 (holding that
“deceit” under Utah Code § 63G-7-301(5)(b) refers to the common-law tort of
deceit); Black’s Law Dictionary 435 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “deceit” as “a
false statement of fact made by a person knowingly or recklessly . . . with
the intent that someone else will act upon it”).
62.

Bennett, 2003 UT 9, at ¶ 47.

63. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/in respect to (last visited Aug. 27, 2019); MerriamWebster Online Thesaurus, https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/in
respect to (last visited Aug. 27, 2019).
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B. The context and purpose of Subsection (4) does not support the
Court of Appeals’ interpretation.
To be fair, the Court of Appeals seems to recognize that the plain
text of Subsection (4) does not support its interpretation, as it states that
it reached that interpretation after “reviewing the provision in context.”64
Holly agrees that context is a valuable tool in interpreting Subsection
(4)—in interpreting statutes, courts should consider the language of
statutes in light of “the purpose of the statute and what interpretation
and application will best serve that purpose in practical operation.”65
However, because the Court of Appeals’ interpretation does not serve the
purpose of the statute in practical operation, it should be rejected in favor
of an interpretation that is consistent with the purpose of punishing
misuse of judicial proceedings and hindering the administration of justice.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals cites portions of its language to
conclude that “the entire thrust of the subsection is aimed at allowing a
court to penalize deceitful misuse of judicial proceedings by parties to
those proceedings.”66 However, even if one accepts that the purpose of
Subsection (4) is to prevent deceitful misuse of judicial proceedings, it
does not follow that Subsection (4) “must be interpreted to include only

64.

Infra at 42–43 (Op. at ¶ 14).

65. ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 65, ¶ 17,
245 P.3d 184.
66.

Infra at 42–43 (Op. at ¶ 14).
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deceit committed on the court”67 unless one makes the assumption that a
party can only misuse judicial proceedings by deceiving the court. This is
simply untrue.
In Utah, judges often direct one of the parties to draft proposed
orders, judgments and decrees for the court’s signature.68 Of course, this
creates an opportunity for the party preparing the order to subtly (or at
times, blatantly) draft the provisions of the order in a way that
advantages that party. Despite that opportunity for mischief, judges do
not usually painstakingly review proposed orders to ensure their
provisions conform to prior stipulations of the parties or the court’s
decisions. Rather, they largely rely upon the other parties to do that work
for them through the procedures of approval as to form and objections.69
This system of giving the parties primary responsibility for detecting and
raising errors in orders, judgments and decrees is a part of the
adversarial system of justice, and is essential to judicial economy.70
However, the system also allows a party to obtain an order by deceit
without directly deceiving the judge. Because the Court of Appeals’
assumption that a party can only misuse judicial proceedings by deceiving
the court is not valid, it follows that the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that

67.

Infra at 41 (Op. at ¶ 13).

68.

See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(j)(2); Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(c)(1).

69.

See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(j)(3)–(4); Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(c)(2)–(3).

70.

See Johnson, 2017 UT 76 at ¶ 8.
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Subsection (4) includes only deceit committed on the court must be
rejected.
However, this is not to say that, as suggested by the plain text of
Subsection (4), any party who makes a willful misrepresentation in
connection with a judicial proceeding is in contempt of court. As
Subsection (4) is a statute defining contempt of court, the deceit that
Subsection (4) includes should be those that fit within the general
definition of contempt: “disobedience to, disregard of, interference with, or
disrespect of the court, by acts in opposition to its authority and the
administration

of

justice,

hindering,

impeding,

embarrassing,

or

obstructing the court in the discharge of its duties,”71 including conduct
“calculated to intimidate, influence, impede, embarrass, or obstruct the
courts in the due administration of justice in matters pending before
them.”72 With that in mind, it is clear that not all deceits are
contemptible. Rather, a deceit is contemptible if it impedes the court’s
authority and its function of the administration of justice. This is
reflected in the rule in most jurisdictions that perjury does not constitute
contempt of court unless the perjury operates to obstruct the judicial
process.73
71.

17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 2 (Rev. ed. 2019).

72. Herald-Republican Publishing Co. v. Lewis, 129 P. 624, 633 (Utah
1913) (Frick, J., concurring).
73. J.A. Bock, Annotation, Perjury or False Swearing as Contempt, 89
A.L.R.2d 1258, § 2 (1963, rev. ed 2019).
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C. The text and context of Subsection (4), as well as the case law
from other jurisdictions, related principles of Utah law and
scholarly writings support an interpretation of Subsection (4)
equivalent to that of the Fraud on the Court doctrine.
As demonstrated supra, rather than deciding whether a party’s
misrepresentation is contemptible based on who the misrepresentation is
communicated to, it is more consistent with the context of Subsection (4)
and the general definition of contempt to focus on whether the
misrepresentation interfered with the administration of justice. However,
rather than creating an entirely new set of doctrines from scratch to
govern Subsection (4), the Court should consider importing the
jurisprudence from the related doctrine of Fraud on the Court, which is
well established in Utah law.
The Fraud on the Court doctrine is part of the jurisprudence for
setting aside a judgment. Under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a party may set aside a judgment on the basis of “fraud . . . ,
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an opposing party,”74 but the
party must file a motion seeking that relief not later than 90 days after
the entry of the judgment.75 However, a party may file an independent
action to set aside a judgment for “fraud upon the court” outside of the 90day time limit.76 Fraud on the court is narrower than ordinary fraud

74.

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).

75.

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(c).

76.

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(d).
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between the parties—it requires an “unconscionable scheme calculated to
interfere with the judicial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate a
matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the
presentation of the opposing party’s claim or defense.”77 It also includes
any “intentional act by a party in a divorce action which prevents the
opposing party from making a full defense,”78 including deceiving a party
or concealing relevant facts from a party if the deception hinders the
party’s ability to present its case.79
This interpretation of contemptible deceit as equivalent to fraud on
the court is consistent with the decisions of other jurisdictions. Federal
courts have recognized that “the commission of a fraud on the court can
form the basis for a finding of contempt.”80 This conclusion by the federal

77. Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated on
other grounds, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see Kartchner v. Kartchner,
2014 UT App 195, ¶ 26, 334 P.3d 1.
78.

Kartchner, 2014 UT App 195 at ¶ 27.

79. Cobell, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (noting that a false representation to a
party is contemptible “fraud on the court” when it hinders the party’s ability
to present its case); see also Kartchner, 2014 UT App 195 at ¶ 27 n.9
(dismissing as without merit a party’s argument that misleading the other
party is not conduct directed at the court and is therefore not fraud on the
court).
80. Cobell, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 26 (citing cases); see Aoude v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1119 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that federal courts have
inherent power to punish “fraud on the court” (as defined in Cobell) as part
of their inherent power “to do whatever is reasonably necessary to deter
abuse of the judicial process”).
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courts is also supported by case law from other jurisdictions and treatises
on the subject.81
Moreover, it appears that nine states currently have statutory
provisions similar to Subsection (4) in their laws,82 and that two states
previously had a similar provision sometime in the past.83 While Holly
has not found any case from these jurisdictions that is “on all fours” with
the issue presented in this case, the case law generally seems to

81. See, e.g., Rockdale Mgmt. Co. v. Shawmut Bank, 683 N.E.2d 29, 31
(Mass. 1994) (holding that when a fraud on the court (defined similarly to
that in Cobell) is committed in an ongoing case, “the trial judge has the
inherent power to take action [and] broad discretion to fashion a judicial
response warranted by the fraudulent conduct”); State v. Moquin, 191 A.2d
541 (N.H. 1963) (holding that municipal courts had authority to punish
fraud on the court as contempt, as all courts have the duty “to protect the
judicial processes from being brought into disrepute and to act vigorously
when confronted with acts or conduct which tend to obstruct or interfere
with the due and orderly administration of justice”); 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 42
(Rev. ed. 2019) (“Willful abuse of legal process, such as instituting, or
procuring the institution of, unauthorized or fictitious proceedings or suits,
or obtaining court orders by fraud or deceit, provided the other party is
prejudiced thereby, is contempt.”).
82. Ala. Code § 12-1-8(4); Alaska Stat. § 9.50.010(4); Idaho Code Ann.
§ 7-601(4); La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 224(4); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.1701(d); Minn. Stat. § 588.01(3)(2); Mont. Code Ann. § 3-1-501(1)(d);
N.Y. Jud. Ct. Acts Law § 753(a)(2); Wyo. R. Crim Proc. 42(a)(2)(B).
83. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1209(a)(4) (repealed 1907 ch. 255, § 1); Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 33.010 (repealed 1991 c. 724, § 32).
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emphasize that the misrepresentation interfered with the administration
of justice rather than who the misrepresentation was communicated to.84
For example, In the New York case of Fass & Wolper v. Burns, the
defendant, upon having a judgment entered against him, sought a stay of
execution against his assets.85 Defendant’s request was granted without
objection and without the imposition of any express conditions.86 During
the pendency of that stay, the defendant made an assignment of his
assets for the benefit of creditors.87 The court found that when a
defendant seeks a stay, “he impliedly agrees, in consideration of the favor
so extended to him, that he will not, during the pendency of the stay,
transfer or dispose of his assets or otherwise disturb the status quo.”88
The court further stated that both it and the plaintiff were entitled to rely
84. See, e.g., United States v. Talbot, 133 F. Supp. 120, 127–28 (D.
Alaska Terr. 1955) (holding that to punish perjury as contempt under
Alaska’s analog to Subsection 4, “the matter which is falsely given must be
material to the matter before the court, and . . . there must be the element
of obstruction of the court in the administration of justice”); Ex Parte Acock,
23 P. 1029, 1030 (Cal. 1890) (holding that “the acts of petitioner” in
deceiving a sheriff to obtain property held by the sheriff for the court “were
contempts within the meaning of” statute defining deceit as contempt); 21
N.Y. Jur. 2d Contempt § 21 (Rev. ed. 2019) (noting that “filing a false
affidavit may constitute contempt,” but “false statements in an affidavit do
not constitute contempt where the statements are immaterial to any
questions in the case or where the rights or remedies of the other party have
not been defeated, impeded, or prejudiced”).
85.

Fass & Wolper, Inc. v. Burns, 177 Misc. 430, 430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1941).

86.

Id.

87.

Id.

88.

Id. at 431–32.
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upon that implied promise, and the act of assigning assets for the benefit
of creditors during a stay constitutes contempt, as it “is a fraud and
deceit, as well as an abuse of a mandate or proceeding of a court within
the meaning of [the analog of Subsection (4).”89
Likewise, in the Michigan case of In re Contempt of Black, attorney
David Black called opposing counsel and represented that he would be
late for a 10:00 hearing and would not be there before 11:00, and that he
had

already

contacted

the

trial

court.90

However,

despite

this

representation, Black had not contacted the court and timely arrived at
the hearing.91 In reliance upon Black’s representation, opposing counsel
did not arrive for the hearing until 10:45.92 Opposing counsel explained
Black’s representations to the trial court, but Black denied making those
representations.93 The trial court found Black in contempt for making
false representations to opposing counsel as well as deliberately lying to
the court.94 The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s
contempt ruling.95

89.

Id. at 432.

90. In re Contempt of Black, No. 285330, 2009 WL 3014938, at *1 (Mich.
App. Sept. 22, 2009).
91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94.

Id. at *1–2.

95.

Id. at *2–3.
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The facts of the present case clearly show a deception that
interferes with the administration of justice and that fits nicely into
Utah’s Fraud on the Court doctrine. The district court found that Ron
engaged in a deliberate course of deception to obtain a court order by
inducing Holly to sign a stipulation rather than enforce the terms of the
mediation agreement with the court. This is an intentional act by a party
that prevents the opposing party from making a full defense and a
deceitful misuse of judicial proceedings. It is therefore contemptible deceit
under Subsection (4).

II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
BECAUSE THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF SUBSECTION (4) WAS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE IT.
As explained supra in the Statement of the Case, Ron did not raise
the issue of whether Ron’s fraud was contemptible deceit under
Subsection (4) either before the district court or in his opening brief.96
“When a party fails to raise and argue an issue in the trial court, it has
failed to preserve the issue, and an appellate court will not typically reach
that issue absent a valid exception to preservation.”97 Moreover, “when a
party fails to raise and argue an issue on appeal, or raises it for the first
time in a reply brief, that issue is waived and will typically not be

96.

See supra notes 39–40 & 52–53 and surrounding text.

97.

Johnson, 2017 UT 76 at ¶ 15.
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addressed by the appellate court.”98 While there are exceptions that will
allow an appellate court to reach an issue that was not preserved at trial
and was not raised on appeal, as shown below, none of those exceptions
apply in this case.
In State v. Johnson, this Court outlined three instances when an
appellate court “may reach an issue when the issue was not preserved,
there is no valid exception to preservation, and it was not raised by the
parties on appeal”: the subject matter jurisdiction exception,99 the
statutory exception,100 and the “pure law” exception.101 As the subject
matter jurisdiction exception and the statutory exception obviously do not
apply in this case, Holly will focus on the pure law exception.
Under the pure law exception,
an appellate court may reach a waived and unpreserved issue
when it is 1) a purely legal issue, 2) that is almost certain to arise
and assist in the analysis in other cases, 3) is necessary to correctly
determine an issue that was properly raised, and 4) neither party
is unfairly prejudiced by raising the issue at that point or neither
party argues that they are unfairly prejudiced. Examples of this
include whether to overrule precedent on which the parties rely,
interpreting the law that the parties rely on, determining that a
law is inapplicable, determining if a statute relied upon is still
effective, and considering controlling authority that was not raised
by either party.102
98.

Id. at ¶ 16.

99.

Id. at ¶ 50.

100. Id. at ¶ 52.
101. Id. at ¶ 51.
102. Id. (citations omitted).
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The issue of the proper interpretation of Subsection (4) fails to meet
the third requirement of the pure law exception. The only issue that Ron
raised that related to deceit was whether the trial court erred “in finding
that Ron committed fraud by clear and convincing evidence” and whether
the trial court made sufficient findings.103 While the issue of whether
Ron’s deceit was contemptible as a matter of law under Subsection (4)
would obviate the need to determine the issues of whether there was
sufficient evidence or sufficient findings, it cannot be said to be necessary
to determine those issues.
Moreover, regardless of whether the Court of Appeals could have
invoked the pure law exception to reach the issue of the interpretation of
Subsection (4), it did not follow proper procedure in doing so. Before an
appellate court avails itself of an exception to preservation and waiver
and raises the issue sua sponte, it should “examine closely the
appropriateness of acting despite the existence of waiver,” including
allowing the parties to argue whether the issue should be considered.104
Moreover, the appellate court “should typically allow some form of
argument from the parties to test a notion of the court’s own invention
before using it to justify a reversal.”105 This is ordinarily done by ordering
supplemental briefing, as it “gives the parties adequate time to research

103. Br. Appellant at 2.
104. Id. at ¶ 44.
105. Id. at ¶ 45.
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and draft thoughtful responses.”106 In essence, what is required before an
appellate court reaches an unpreserved and waived issue is notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
In this case, despite the fact that Ron failed to preserve the issue of
whether his fraud was contemptible deceit under Subsection (4) in the
trial court and failed to raise the issue in his opening brief, the Court of
Appeals considered the issue sua sponte without giving Holly meaningful
notice of that decision or ordering supplemental briefing of the waived
issue before issuing its opinion. As such, she did not have the opportunity
to argue whether any of the exceptions to waiver applied, and the only
opportunity she had to address the issue was at oral argument. Because
Holly’s counsel did not have any prior notice that the Court of Appeals
would focus on the issue at oral argument (given the rules on waiver, the
fact that the issue was raised for the first time in the reply brief was not
adequate to provide notice), he had no ability to prepare and address the
issue in advance of oral argument.107 Also, there was nothing in the Court
of Appeals’ opinion that showed that it examined the appropriateness of
reaching the waived issue.

106. Id. at ¶ 45.
107. These facts make the Court of Appeals’ observation in Paragraph 15
of its opinion that Holly provided it with no case “in which a court held a
person in contempt for deceit that occurred outside of the presence of the
court, was directed towards another party, and did not involve false sworn
testimony or the filing of a falsified document” all the more frustrating.
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Finally, Ron has previously argued that the Court of Appeals was
justified in addressing the issue because it was raised by Holly in her
brief.108 While Ron cites Brown v. Glover109 for the proposition that an
issue is not waived if it is addressed in the opposing brief,110 this
misunderstands the scope of the holding in Brown. In Brown, this Court
held that a new issue first raised by the appellee as alternate grounds for
affirmance and responded to by the appellant in her reply brief was
properly before the Court of Appeals.111 Other jurisdictions have
discussed the scope of this rule, holding that while issues that “relate to
the basis of the district court’s ruling” must be raised in the opening brief,
“when an appellee raises in its answer brief an alternative ground for
affirmance, the appellant is entitled to respond in its reply brief.”112 In
this case, Ron did not argue in his opening brief that fraud was not a
basis for contempt—rather, he only addressed whether the evidence
supporting his deceit was sufficient for the district court to find fraud by

108. Resp. Cert. at 16 & 18.
109. 2000 UT 89, 16 P.3d 540.
110. Resp. Cert. at 18.
111. Brown, 2000 UT 89 at ¶¶ 20–26.
112. United States v. Brown, 348 F.3d 1200, 1213 (10th Cir. 2003); see
Newsome v. Bd. of Elections, 415 S.E.2d 201, 203–04 (N.C. App. 1992)
(holding that an issue first raised in the opposing brief is a “new issue” that
can be responded to in a reply brief when the issue does not arise naturally
and logically from the record and question presented”).
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clear and convincing evidence.113 In response, Holly cited to Subsection (4)
in her brief by way of background and context, not as an alternate
grounds for affirmance. Ron cannot take advantage of Holly’s attempt to
provide the Court of Appeals with relevant background to raise additional
issues. Secondly, and just as importantly, this justification would not
allow the Court of Appeals to reach the issue without relying upon an
exception to waiver, as Ron did not preserve the issue below, and to the
best of Holly’s knowledge, there is no exception to preservation that
applies.114
Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeals improperly
reached the issue of the proper interpretation of Subsection (4). This
Court should reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision and remand to
determine any properly raised outstanding issues in the original appeal.

113. See Pet. Cert. at 10, n.45 and surrounding text.
114. Johnson, 2017 UT 76 at ¶ 47 (“When an issue has not been preserved
in the trial court, but the parties argue that issue on appeal, the parties
must argue an exception to preservation for the issue to be reached on its
merits.”); see id. at ¶¶ 18–39 (discussing the exceptions to preservation).
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CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES 115
Finally, as noted above, the district court awarded Holly her
reasonable attorney fees on the basis that they would not have been
incurred but for Ron’s deceit.116 Thus, Holly was entitled to her attorney
fees under provisions of the Utah Code relating to contempt117 and bad
faith.118 Moreover, Ron did not challenge the basis of this award in his
Objection to Holly’s Request for Attorney Fees before the district court,119
nor did he raise the issue on appeal in his opening brief.120 As such, there
is no dispute that Holly was entitled to her attorney fees below, and she is

115. It appears that, should this Court reverse the Court of Appeals, the
case will return to the Court of Appeals for determination of the issues
raised by Ron that were not reached in the previous decision. Holly is
unsure whether a claim for attorney fees would be addressed by this Court
given this procedural posture, but makes the claim out of an abundance of
caution.
116. See supra notes 48–51 and surrounding text.
117. Utah Code § 78B-6-311(1) (allowing a court to “order the person
proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to
indemnify and satisfy the aggrieved party’s costs and expenses”); see Iota
LLC v. Davco Mgmt. Co., 2016 UT App 231, ¶ 60, 391 P.3d 239 (holding that
“costs and expenses” include “the attorney fees the damaged party
incurred”).
118. Utah Code § 78B-5-825(1) (providing for an award of reasonable
attorney fees “if the court determines that the action or defense to the action
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith”).
119. See R. at 1195–1201.
120. Br. Appellant at 1–3 (outlining the issues raised on appeal).
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thus also entitled to her attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal.121
This includes those attorney fees Holly incurred in the Court of Appeals,
as while she was unsuccessful at that stage in the proceeding, she will
have been “ultimately vindicated” by prevailing on appeal before this
Court.122

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Holly asks that this Court reverse the
Court of Appeals’ decision in this matter and remand to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of August, 2019.

/S/ Stephen D. Spencer
Stephen D. Spencer
SPENCER LAW OFFICE, PLLC
Attorney for Petitioner

121. Jordan Constr., Inc. v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 2017 UT 28, ¶ 71,
408 P.3d 296.
122. Cf. Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 2010 UT App 361, ¶¶ 50–52,
246 P.3d 131; Cache County v. Beus, 2005 UT App 204, ¶¶ 16–17, 128 P.3d
63.
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that this brief was prepared using Microsoft Word
and uses Century Schoolbook typeface in 13-point font. According to
Microsoft Word’s word-count function, this brief contains 8,148 words,
excluding the caption, table of contents, table of authorities, certificate of
compliance, certificate of service and addendum. This brief is therefore in
compliance with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. P. 24(g).
I further certify that this petition, including the appendix, does not
contain any non-public information and is therefore in compliance with
Utah R. App. P. 21(g).123
DATED this 28th day of August, 2019.

/S/ Stephen D. Spencer
Stephen D. Spencer
SPENCER LAW OFFICE, PLLC
Attorney for Petitioner

123. While the court records in this action are generally classified as
private, the appendix contains only judgments, orders and decrees in the
action, which are classified as public records. See UCJA 4-202.02(4)(B).
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing
PETITIONER’S OPENING BRIEF to be delivered via email to the
following recipients:
Steven W. Beckstrom
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
swb@scmlaw.com
Attorney for Respondent Ronald Lee Rosser
DATED this 28th day of August, 2019.

/S/ Stephen D. Spencer
Stephen D. Spencer
SPENCER LAW OFFICE, PLLC
Attorney for Petitioner

Spencer Law Office PLLC
Petitioner’s Opening Brief

34

Aug. 28, 2019
No. 20190320-SC

UTAH CODE § 78B-6-301
As renumbered and amended by 2008 Utah Laws 48, 463 (c. 3 § 914)
Version effective Feb. 7, 2008–Present
————— ◆ —————
Acts and omissions constituting contempt.
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or its proceedings are contempts of the
authority of the court:
(1)

disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the court,
tending to interrupt the course of a trial or other judicial proceeding;

(2)

breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, tending to interrupt the due
course of a trial or other judicial proceeding;

(3)

misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty by an attorney, counsel,
clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected to perform a judicial or ministerial
service;

(4)

deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by a party to an action or
special proceeding;

(5)

disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court;

(6)

acting as an officer, attorney or counselor, of a court without authority;

(7)

rescuing any person or property that is in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or
process of the court;

(8)

unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going to, remaining at, or
returning from, the court where the action is on the calendar for trial;

(9)

any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court;

(10) disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn or to answer as a
witness;
(11) when summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or serve, or improperly
conversing with a party to an action to be tried at the court, or with any other person,
concerning the merits of an action, or receiving a communication from a party or other
person in respect to it, without immediately disclosing the communication to the court; and
(12) disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer of the lawful judgment, order or
process of a superior court, or proceeding in an action or special proceeding contrary to
law, after the action or special proceeding is removed from the jurisdiction of the inferior
tribunal, magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the lawful orders or process of a judicial
officer is also a contempt of the authority of the officer.
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: September 06, 2017
/s/ PAUL D LYMAN
04:16:46 PM
District Court Judge

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH,
GARFIELD COUNTY, PANGUITCH DEPARTMENT
HOLLY R. ROSSSER,

ORDER ON PETITIONER’S MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

Petitioner,
v.

Case no. 154600013
Judge: Paul D. Lyman

RONALD L. ROSSER,
Respondent.

The Court, having heretofore ordered that Petitioner should have a judgment for her
reasonable attorney’s fees and having reviewed the affidavit of Petitioner’s attorney regarding
those fees and the exhibits attached thereto, along with the Respondent’s objections, now hereby
ORDERS as follows:
1.

Petitioner is awarded her reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of seventeen thousand,
eight hundred seventy ($17,870.00) dollars.

2.

Petitioner is awarded her costs in the amount of three hundred forty-eight dollars and ten
cents. ($348.10.)

3.

The total judgment amount awarded to Petitioner shall be augmented by $18,218.10 for
Petitioner’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

4.

 The foregoing amount is fair and reasonable given the Respondent’s bad faith and
contempt in this matter.

September 06, 2017 04:16 PM
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: June 24, 2019
/s/ Thomas R. Lee
06:32:38 PM
Associate Chief Justice

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---oo0oo---

Holly Rebecca Rosser,
Petitioner,
v.
Ronald Lee Rosser,
Respondent.

ORDER
Supreme Court Case No. 20190320-SC
Court of Appeals Case No. 20170736-CA
Trial Court Case No. 154600013

This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed on April 17,
2019.
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted as to the following issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its construction and application of Subsection
78B-6-301(4) of the Utah Code.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in addressing the issue of the proper
interpretation of Subsection 78B-6-301(4) of the Utah Code in light of the briefing on
appeal.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. The parties shall comply with the
briefing schedule upon its issuance. Requests for extension are disfavored, but may be
granted with good cause.
End of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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